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THE GRAMMATICAL PUZZLES OF SOCRATES' LAST WORDS* 
 
             After waiting outside for a time, as they were told to do, the doorkeeper informs 
Phaedo and the other young friends of Socrates that "the Eleven are releasing him (sc. from a 
leg-iron), and pronouncing the sentence that on this day he should end his life." The friends 
are let into the prison. Socrates has had the leg-iron struck off, and is supine on a couch. 
Xanthippe, already there when Phaedo and the others enter, is seated, holding his son, a baby 
in arms. When she sees Socrates' friends, she loses her composure. Crito, a wealthy man, 
accompanied by a number of attendants, is also there. Socrates bids him have Xanthippe taken 
home. Socrates sits up. Philosophical discussions commence. Socrates argues for the personal 
survival of the soul in an afterlife. The discussions are spun out over many hours until late in 
the afternoon (Phd. 61e–115a).  
               The discussions ended, Crito asks Socrates chiastically "What do you instruct them or 
me to do regarding the children or anything else . . . ?" (τί δὲ τούτοις ἢ ἐμοὶ ἐπιστέλλεις ἢ 
περὶ τῶν παίδων ἢ περὶ ἄλλου του . . . ;). By requesting instructions for himself regarding the 
children, Crito indicates that he is willing to be their guardian after Socrates dies. Socrates 
ignores Crito's request. Socrates tangentially acknowledges the existence of his children, 
saying "If you (sc. Crito and the young friends) attend to yourselves, you will be serving me 
and mine, and yourselves as well." As the plural verbs of the last words (ὀφείλομεν, ἀπόδοτε, 
ἀμελήσητε) are grammatically puzzling, I note that Socrates refers to himself here in the 
singular (ἐμοὶ), and refers to his sons in the plural (τοῖς ἐμοῖς), who are three in number. The 
main room of the prison is not the appropriate place to provide instructions regarding the 
sons, as Phaedo and the other young friends present, many of them foreigners, will not be 
implementing them. 
         Socrates, accompanied by Crito, now goes off to a side room. The young friends are 
ordered to stay behind. Phaedo, in the main room with the others, recounts what happened in 
the side room, by the legerdemain of literary license (Phd. 116a7–b5): "and when he had bathed 
 
             * Translations of the text are mine unless otherwise indicated. I follow the text of BURNET, J. (1901–06). 
Platonis opera. 5 vols. Oxford.        
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and his children had been brought to him—for he had two little sons and one big one—and the 
women of the family had come, he talked with them in Crito's presence, and gave them such  
directions as he wished; then he told the women to go away, and he came to us1."  Whilst in the 
side room, Socrates provides the instructions (ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο), requested earlier 
by Crito in the main room. Crito stands in front of Socrates (ἐναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος), taking 
note of the specificities of the instructions. Xanthippe is again present, as why would she not 
be2? Socrates is facing imminent death, he has a family, who appear only in Phaedo, and he is  
the father of three sons. The nurture and education of his sons must be attended to. Crito's 
request for instructions in that regard in the main room of the prison, and Socrates providing 
instructions in the side room, establishes the fact that Crito is their prospective guardian.  
            Socrates returns to the main room and sits down freshly bathed. The servant of the 
Eleven arrives and stands in front of him. It is not yet nightfall. He has come to announce that 
the countdown to Socrates' execution has commenced. Apparently those condemned to die 
were given the privilege of drinking the hemlock at a moment of their choosing in the time 
before full sunset. He eulogizes Socrates and departs in tears. Socrates calls after him to 
express his intention to cooperate in the execution procedure: “I salute you likewise, and we 
will do these things” (καὶ σύ, ἔφη, χαῖρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν). I read the antecedents 
of ποιήσομεν to be Socrates and the servant of the Eleven, as the immediate context suggests. 
Then, addressing "us" (Καὶ ἅμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς), namely the narrator Phaedo and the other young 
friends, Socrates eulogizes the attendant. Socrates now addresses Crito: "Crito, let us be 
persuaded by the situation (πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ) (sc. that the time is now), and have someone 
bring the poison!"  
        Crito demurs urging Socrates to delay as long as possible, as many under sentence of 
death indulge in eating, drinking and even having sex up to the last moment. Socrates again 
bids Crito be persuaded, replacing the urbane and emollient πειθώμεθα with bare injunctives: 
πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει. The altered syntax reflects Socrates' sense of urgency, and his  
           
                  1 Translation of FOWLER (1914, 395, 397).  
                  2 Cf. BURNET (1911, 144): "It is surely impossible to believe with some editors that Xanthippe is not included 
among the οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες. The mere fact that the youngest child is brought back seems to show that she is." 
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impatience with Crito's delaying tactics. Crito is persuaded, and nods to a slave-boy standing  
nearby to fetch the man to administer the poison. Although he is their prospective guardian,  
Crito is not acting here on behalf of the children. The exact time of Socrates' death does not 
affect their welfare one way or another. The servant of the Eleven3, summoned, returns and 
asks whether Socrates knows what he must do (τί χρὴ ποιεῖν). Socrates says that he does. He 
asks if a bit of the hemlock may be poured out as a libation to some god. This is not feasible for 
technical reasons. Socrates prays to the gods that his passage yonder may be one of good 
fortune. The man hands him the kylix, and Socrates drinks down the hemlock. These twinned 
acts make up the doing of the things, which Socrates spoke of earlier, at Phaedo 116d4. His 
friends are reduced to tears and, in the case of Apollodorus, who had been weeping 
continuously, to cry out aloud. Socrates admonishes them for their womanish lack of 
composure. 
           Socrates’ death by hemlock poison is depicted at length. The covering and uncovering of 
Socrates' face permits him to utter his last words. He is supine on a couch, as he was when he 
spoke his first words (Phd. 60a7–8), afterwards sitting up. He says "Crito, we owe (sc. one) 
rooster to Asclepius. Discharge (sc. the debt) and do not fail to attend to it!" (Ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, 
τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα· ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε).  
         In the first clause, who are the we of "we owe" other than Socrates? And for whom is the 
debt owed? In the second clause, why is Socrates' injunction to discharge the debt expressed in 
the plural? As the first clause was prefaced with the address "O Crito," is Crito the single 
addressee in the second clause, or are there other addressees? 
          WILAMOWITZ, NOCK, CLARK, MOST, and CALDER have attempted to answer these  
 
        3 Cf. BURNET (1911, 116): "It is to be observed that the man who administers the hemlock draught is not the 
same person as the officer of the Eleven." A remark of the former speaks against BURNET's observation. Earlier, at 
Phaedo 116d2–3, Socrates promised the servant of the Eleven (ὁ τῶν ἕνδεκα ὑπηρέτης) that "we will do these 
things." Later, the unnamed man, with whom Socrates does these things, seems to be the same person. The man 
explains why a libation of the hemlock is not feasible: "We grind up only so much (sc. hemlock) as we calculate is 
enough . . . ." He expresses himself in the plural because as the servant of the Eleven, he is the director of the 
prison and manages its staff: the doorkeeper (ὁ θυρωρός [Phd. 59e4]), the prison guard (ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου 
φύλαξ [Cri. 43a5–6]), and unnamed others.                          
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questions. According to MOST (1993), following CLARK (1952), Plato, not in attendance at the 
prison, is to be the beneficiary of the cure. Thanks to the second sight accorded to the  
dying, Socrates foresees Plato's future recovery from his current bout of illness. The 
antecedents of ὀφείλομεν are many: Socrates, Crito, the young friends, and the future 
audience of the dialogues immortalizing the philospher that Plato will publish after his 
recovery. If so, one would expect the text to read "we will owe" instead of "we owe." It also 
seems odd that, according to Most’s scenario, Crito and an unknown number of others would 
be procuring and sacrificing one rooster to Asclepius for the wealthy Plato’s cure, rather than 
the author once recovered discharging the debt himself. 
            According to CALDER (1999), following NOCK (1950, 49), the beneficiary of the cure is 
Socrates who "thanks the god of health for a lifetime of good health." The grammatical 
plurality of "we owe" is in effect a singular, the pluralis modestiae. This construction is found in 
tragedy. However, so far as I know, there are no other instances of it in Plato, nor does CALDER 
cite any. The endemic morbidity rate of adults in pre-modern cities makes it unlikely that 
Socrates enjoyed lifelong good health. Socrates refers to his own bouts of illness in order to 
illustrate the subjectivity of one person's perceptions, reporting how differently wine tastes 
(sweet or bitter) to Socrates when healthy, and again to Socrates when ailing (Σωκράτη 
ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Σωκράτη αὖ ἀσθενοῦντα [Tht. 159b3–4]). The remark controverts CALDER's 
and NOCK's thesis, unless it be read as expressing a thought experiment unrelated to Socrates' 
lived experience. 
             According to WILAMOWITZ, the beneficiary of the cure is a member of Socrates' 
household, either Xanthippe or one of the sons. He writes (1920, 2:58):              
        Sokrates hat das gesagt, weil es ihm einfiel; weshalb den Asklepios . . . das Gelübde getan              
        war, wissen wir nicht, fragen wir nicht. Xanthippe oder eins der Kinder wird krank 
        gewesen sein, was es war. Es war eine geringfügige Sache für Sokrates, da hatte er es  
        vergessen, als er draußen seine letzten Bestimmungen über diese irdischen Dinge traf. 
               WILAMOWITZ does not explain how he arrives at the conclusion that the rooster 
sacrifice to Asclepius is owed for recovery from disease of someone of Socrates' household. (If 
one provisionally accepts WILAMOWITZ's hypothesis, in view of the fact that Xanthippe's days 
of bearing Socrates' children are over, it is more likely that one of the sons, who are the future 
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of the οἶκος, would be the beneficiary of the cure). WILAMOWITZ passes over in silence his 
reading of the grammatical plural "we owe," namely that Socrates uses the plural because he is 
speaking as the head of his household, and that "we owe a rooster to Asclepius" indicates that 
his οἶκος, which is a collectivity, has incurred a debt for the cure of one of its members, a 
young child himself unable to pay the debt. The first-person plural ὀφείλομεν, read that way, 
would be an example of the pluralis patris familiae, grammatically identical to the pluralis 
societatis. In the second clause of the last words, Socrates bids Crito, again using the pluralis 
patris familiae, speaking to him as head of his household—apparently the status required for 
that of guardian—to act on behalf of Socrates' οἶκος. Crito is to arrange for a communal 
sacrifice ritual of a rooster4, which will be effected by means of the collective instrumentality of 
his οἶκος as he directs5.  Socrates employs the same syntax twice in bidding Crito do 
something, a pair of injunctives, the second injunctive a double negative to emphasize the first. 
At Phaedo 117a3, Crito is enjoined in the singular to act on Socrates' sole behalf by having 
someone bring the hemlock without delay: πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει. The exact moment of 
Socrates' death does not affect the welfare of his children. At Phaedo 118a8, in the second clause 
of the last words, Crito the householder and the guardian of the sons is enjoined with the same 
syntax, but this time in the plural (ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε), that he and his 
household act on behalf of Socrates' οἶκος. 
         Again according to WILAMOWITZ, the debt is owed for a minor thing, and that is why 
Socrates forgot to arrange for its payment earlier when he issued the instructions to Crito and 
the household women. But is paying the debt owed for a son who survived a bout of illness, 
and did not die, a trifling matter? It is not gossip to note that WILAMOWITZ published these 
words in 1920, after his son Tycho, a promising philologist, fell in battle at the beginning of the  
 
                 4  Cf. an Attic fifth-century BCE red-figure oinochoe held in the Louvre, imaged at 
http://www.louvre.fr/oeuvre-notices/oenochoe-attique-figures-rouges/, which depicts a communal sacrifice ritual. 
What appears to be a dressed, trussed fowl on a spit is held over a fire altar by a naked youth. A man pours a 
libation from a kylix on the altar. Another man leans on a staff observing the sacrifice. All are wreathed.   
                5 Cf. CALDER's scenario for the second clause (1999, 562): "The second person plurals (ἀπόδοτε, μὴ 
ἀμελήσητε) refer to Crito and the servant who would cut the rooster's throat."  
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Great War. WILAMOWITZ's personal accommodation to the death of his only son, permitting  
him to return to his work, may have had something to do with his conviction that it is an 
insignificant worldly matter to Socrates that a son recovered from disease and did not die. As 
we do not hear the specificities of Socrates' instructions at Phaedo 116b3–4, the instruction to 
pay the debt in the last words is more likely a repeated than a forgotten one, repeated because 
its place in the hierarchy of instructions issued earlier was near or at the top.  
           As WILAMOWITZ recognized, "we owe" in the last words represents Socrates speaking for 
his οἶκος, which owes a debt for the recovery from disease of one of his sons. For which son is 
the rooster owed? Xanthippe's presence at Phaedo 60a1–3 seems to supply the answer. Socrates' 
youngest son, a baby in arms, has been brought to the prison. Its mother, seated, is holding it 
(ἔχουσάν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην), presumably so that Socrates, supine on 
the couch and chained, may see the baby. Had Socrates primarily summoned Xanthippe, the 
infant would have been left at home with the women of the οἶκος6. The other sons were not 
summoned. The morbidity rate of infants in fourth-century BC Athens would correlate with 
the endemic rate of infant death before the age of one year in pre-modern cities7. It is a near 
certainty that the baby had recently recovered from disease. The household's debt to Asclepius 
for its cure has not yet been paid. With his last words, the dying philosopher Socrates, the man 
of logos, speaking for his household, repeats the instruction to pay for the cure of his youngest 
son, a baby in arms, not yet talking8, who had recovered from disease and did not die.     
        The atomic facts that make up this nested pair of antitheses are woven into the text, 
 
               6 For a modest household such as his, Xanthippe and Crito the prospective guardian of the children would 
have sufficed to take note of the instructions that Socrates delivers at Phaedo 116a7–b5. The οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες, who 
appear at this time (they are also mentioned at Phaedo 117d9 as having been sent away), and would have washed 
Socrates' corpse, had he not bathed, and would have taken care of the baby at home, had Socrates not instructed 
that it be brought to the prison, seem a necessary invention on Plato's part, for their function of minding children 
permits the baby's appearance in the prison not be adventitious. 
         7 Angel (1975, Table I) estimates infant mortality under one year in Classical Greece (650 BC) as 500 per 1000 
births.   
               8 For typical development ages for walking and for talking, cf.        
https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/002010.htm 
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and drawn from everyday life. Everyone knows that infants suffer frequent illnesses, and that  
children begin to talk after they learn to walk. The death of Socrates is a given. But the  
rhetorical arrangement of the facts that inform Socrates' instruction regarding his youngest son  
(dying/speaking versus not yet talking/living) suggests that Socrates' ultimate worldly 
transaction on behalf of the baby is Plato's invention. Plato represents Socrates' last words as a 
secular statement, reflecting his concern for his biological family, of personal signficance only, 
in no way a philosophical exhortation to the young friends. The presence of the baby at Phaedo 
60a in the prison, before the young friends enter, and Socrates' corpse at the end of the 
dialogue, serve as a framing device to the arguments for the survival of the soul after death. 
               Plato reveals his own opinion of those arguments at Phaedo 115d3–6. Crito likes to 
listen to philosophical discussions (φιλήκοος μὲν ἔγωγε [Euth. 304c7]), as he does in 
Euthydemus, and he shows himself perfectly competent to follow their logic as, for example, 
when Socrates recounts to him the closely argued pursuit with Kleinias of the telos of the art of 
the kingly ruler in that dialogue. When Crito in Phaedo hears Socrates assert that "I will depart 
and go off to certain of the joys of the Blessed Ones" (οἰχήσομαι ἀπιὼν εἰς μακάρων δή τινας 
εὐδαιμονίας), Plato puts the opinion in Crito's mind that Socrates is consoling the grieving 
young friends as well as himself. As Crito does not express that opinion openly out of 
consideration for the present circumstances, Socrates conveniently reads his mind for the 
audience's sake: ταῦτά μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγει, παραμυθούμενος ἅμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἅμα 
δ’ ἐμαυτόν. I suggest that Crito's opinion reproduces Plato's opinion. If Crito were not 
competent to judge that the arguments for the personal survival of the soul after death 
justifying Socrates' egregious assertion here amount to unverifiable consolations9, it would be 
otiose for Plato to put that opinion in his mind. But Socrates' arguments do in fact console 
Simmias, Cebes, and the other young friends, who presumably overlook or ignore Plato's  
 
         9 As the Greek idiom παραμυθούμενός τινα (”overtalking someone”) indicates, consolation is a kind of 
persuasion, unlike collaborative argumentation that permits of verification or disproof. Cf. Prt. 348d3‒4 where 
Socrates specifies the right way to pursue a thought: "When one is alone and thinks about something, straightway 
he goes about seeking a man, until he should come upon him, to whom he might demonstrate (sc. the thought) 
and, with that man, ascertain (sc. whether it be true or false)."  
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opinion of the matter semi-hidden in Crito's mind. And the arguments in Phaedo, directly or  
second-hand, in part or in their entirety, have consoled many down through the ages. The  
immortality arguments in Phaedo constitute the moments of a useful fiction, a noble lie to  
mitigate the average man's dread of his personal extinction at death10. In an exercise of literary 
virtuosity, Plato guardedly indicates that Socrates' argument in Phaedo is a γενναῖον ψεῦδος, 
by siting that thought in an inconspicuous, easily overlooked place, in Crito's mind. 
 
              10 Cf. Rep. 3.414b8–c2: “What mechanism, said I, would we have other than fictions created of necessity, of 
which we were just now speaking, fabricating a noble lie to persuade, preferably, the rulers themselves or, failing 
which, the rest of the city?” (τίς ἂν οὖν ἡμῖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μηχανὴ γένοιτο τῶν ψευδῶν τῶν ἐν δέοντι 
γιγνομένων, ὧν δὴ νῦν ἐλέγομεν, γενναῖόν τι ἓν ψευδομένους πεῖσαι μάλιστα μὲν καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς 
ἄρχοντας, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν;).  
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